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INTRODUCTION

The subject of this Article is the early nineteenth-century English debate over the adequacy of the criminal law as it then existed. The debate arose among Members of Parliament over the
wisdom of prescribing the death penalty for a long list of offenses.
Given the renewed demand for employment of the death penalty
in our society, the examination of an earlier debate would seem to
*Professor of History, Univeristy of Oregon. I would like to thank Joan Scott, Doug Hay,
Judy and Ken Greenberg, Duncan Kennedy, Fred Konefsky, Stan Pierson, and Dick Stein
for their comments and encouragement during the writing of this Article.
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be timely.1 Yet, this Article does not support or attack any position
held in the current debate. As will be seen, the terms and emphasis
of the nineteenth-century discussion were quite different from
those prevailing today. The most persuasive arguments for change
at that time were grounded in the special circumstances of English
political and social life. The danger of appropriating any easy "lessons" from the earlier controversy must therefore be recognized.
Rather, this Article is a contribution to the effort to understand
the nature of legal change. The following analysis seeks to be historically specific, while drawing upon insights derived from structuralism and theories of ideology in order to deepen our understanding. Insofar as this account has significance for current
concerns, it directs us to reflect more deeply upon the political and
cultural sources and meanings of the recent demand for the death
penalty.
I.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Traditional interpretations of criminal law reform during this
period can be summarized under three headings: legal-intellectual,
humanitarian, and class interest. The legal-intellectual accounts
involve an explanation of change in terms of specific doctrinal debates and their related intellectual reference (for instance the influence of Bentham on legal thought).2 Reform, in this view, occurred for reasons internal to legal discourse and practice. The
humanitarian approach explains the attack on the death penalty in
terms of a popular revulsion against the cruelty and irrevocability
of death.3 In turn, the class perspective has produced the search
for the economic interests that were served by legal reform; in this
instance reform is explained by appeal to the desire of property
holders to have better security for their property.4 These are undoubtedly over-simplified characterizations, but such simplifications have been the rule in the discussion of legal change. The disparities between these positions point out a perplexing problem for
historical explanation: how to remain faithful to the intellectual
content of a controversy while recognizing the cultural and social
See generally E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975).
2. See generally 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW (1948).
3. See R.K. WEBB, MODERN ENGLAND 177-80 (1974).
4. J. Palmer, Evils Merely Prohibited,3 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 1-16 (1976).
1.
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sources of conflict and change.
The central issue in the debate over capital punishment in
early nineteenth-century England was the discretion exercised by
judge and crown in deciding whether or not to carry out a capital
sentence. To its defenders, the exercise of some degree of personal
judgment in awarding punishment was necessary and desirable.
The Whig reformers challenged the uncertainty in the operation of
the law created by this discretion and suggested that personal
whim played too large a role in determining punishment. Both
sides appealed to legal principles and philosophical theories in defending their positions. Stated in these terms, the controversy has
a familiar ring; we are inclined to see it as one more instance of a
perennial debate over the amount of judicial discretion desirable in
a legal regime.
Legal-historical accounts of these criminal law debates usually
succumb to this temptation. The result is an analysis that is inadequate for two related reasons. First, the issue of discretion was
never fully developed in these debates in strictly legal terms. The
failure was not simply an intellectual shortcoming on the part of
the participants. Discretion more often appeared as a side issue,
taking up less time than the discussion of the claims of humanity
or certainty as principles of punishment. It did, however, figure
more prominently in the appeals made to what might be called the
theater of justice and the listener's common sense. These vivid and
often impassioned appeals focused and simplified this heated political dispute. Consideration of this rhetorical element leads to a second point: by invoking an image of justice, people appealed to
wider beliefs and feelings about what constituted justice. Here they
brought their own experience to bear; they offered up their own
integrity and authority as evidence. In an appeal to the imagination, the philosophical issues were infused with life. In examining
this image of justice, we get closer to the participants' unarticulated understanding of the right order for society.
The image of justice expressed far more than a political
party's position. The debate was neither a matter of weighing the
benefits of one form of justice over another, nor one of being swept
along by some powerful intellectual current, but rather one of
choosing between two forms of life. This is not a randomly chosen
expression. The contest was not merely over what form justice
should take; the question was framed by appeals to the form of
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social life people felt the country had developed and should develop. Any decision necessarily combined what were at once prudential and visionary considerations.
The argument over discretion provides us with the key to understanding the underlying structure of the early nineteenth-century debate over the criminal law. The term "structure" too, is deliberately chosen as a way of describing how different influences
operated upon each other and weighed upon the participants in
these debates. It is a heuristic device (however great the dangers of
using such a contested term) for helping us to understand the systematic interrelationships among such varied things as value, feelings, ideas, perceptions, and social experiences. For in these debates we discover a consistent relationship between internal points
of the argument and references to the social world. These various
relationships accumulate into one particular image of great force
and conviction. This image is raised at a similar point in a number
of different arguments, and it is employed repeatedly in the same
way. It represents an appeal not just to ideas but to social reality,
in however refracted a form. To view a situation in a certain way is
to have already a certain kind of solution in mind. The image expresses a summary of the debate and a demand to resolve it on the
basis of what one "knows" to be true.
We are still left with the problem of explaining the change
that occurs during these years. How, for instance, do we explain
the process whereby the traditional meanings of discretion were invalidated and repressed as a part of the triumph of newer judicial
forms? We can only begin to answer such a question when we see
that the issue of discretion involved conceptions of justice, forms
of social life, and ways of applying power. Discretion was the point
at which wider social and political issues intersected with specific
notions of justice. When the participants most fully evoked the
theme of discretion they did so in highly charged appeals to the
listener's imagination. Such an appeal was not accidental; by appealing to the common sense of their audience speakers hoped to
resolve the conflict. People spoke in terms of specific issues, but
their enthusiasm was generated by a seldom articulated sense of
relation to deeper concerns. It was the shift from one structure of
understanding and values to another that made the debate so bitter and yet made its resolution possible.
The methodological challenge offered by these debates is to
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enrich our understanding of the "reasons" people acted as they did
in particular circumstances. Meanings do not operate in some phenomenological stratosphere, but rather emerge from interactions
between experience and interpretation of the social world. For this
reason, the identity of a class and the character of ruling class
domination are complex creations, arising in part from conscious
decisions and in part from the action of forces only half understood by the actors. To some extent these debates offer us an example of actors consciously manipulating ideas in hopes of shaping
what others saw. Yet, these same people provide ample testimony
of the varied demands they felt were operating on them. They desired to be consistent and coherent, both intellectually and morally. They felt the force of legal tradition and the constraints
placed upon them by the requirements of judicial administration.
They also faced a society which presented them with unsettling
conflicts and profound challenges. To allay the uneasiness they
felt and to express the hopes they had for the future, these Members of Parliament used ideas and images already available in their
society. Thus there was a relationship, however complex and heterogeneous, between the structure of their responses and the structure of the social world they confronted. This relationship cannot
be deduced in advance; it can only be explored in detail as it
emerged in definite historical circumstances.0
A.

Historiographyand the "Progress" of Law Reform

The character of modern criminal justice in England was
formed during the first decades of the nineteenth century. With
the mitigation of the criminal law, 7 the rise of the prison as the
primary form of punishment," and the creation of a professional
5.

See E.P.

THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS

603-710 (1963);

See also A. BRIGGS, THE MAKING OF MODERN ENGLAND 184-235 (1965).
6. My approach here is indebted to R. WILLIAMS, MARXISM AND LITERATURE (1977); R.
KEAT & J. URRY, SOCIAL THEORY AS SCIENCE

(1975); A. GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN So-

(1979); R. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOcIA AND,POLITICAL THEORY
(1976); A. MACINTYRE, Causalityand History, in ESSAYS ON EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTAND-

CIAL THEORY

ING 137-58 (Mannined & Tuomela eds. 1976); and in a special sense to two "classics," K.
MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF Louis BONAPARTE (1975), and L. WITTGENSTIEN, PHIL-

(1968).
7. See generally 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 2.
8. See generally M. IGNATiEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF

OSOPHICAL INVESTIGATMONS

PAIN

(1978).
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police,9 a major extension of state power and a transformation of
the image of justice occurred. In the standard accounts of the period these measures have assumed a self-explanatory character.
Such reforms as the moderation of the criminal law and the provision of defense counsel rights have been offered as evidence of "the
march of intellect"'10 and the powerful "current of humanitarianism" at work in the early nineteenth century." The Whigs, who
championed reform, have been described as impelled by a spreading democratic spirit, by a more rational attitude towards government, and above all else, by a more "humane" social vision.12 The
explanation of legal change by reference to "an age of reform" appeals to popular assumptions about the nature of social progress.
The historians of the law have validated the arguments first offered by the reformers themselves, often in terms just as glowing
and self-congratulatory. 3 In this way, past and present have collaborated to produce a "progressive" account of reform which
lends legitimacy to existing judicial arrangements.
These kinds of assumptions appear most clearly in Leon
Radzinowicz's History of English Criminal Law. Radzinowicz
chronicles for us every phase of the reform movement, from its
early intimations in the eighteenth century to its culmination in
the 1830s. His volume on the death penalty is informed by one
idea-that the gallows represented an inefficient and inhumane
form of punishment. 4 This observation is so obvious to him that
he pauses in wonder before thinkers and politicians who for so long
resisted the "truth." The opponents of change are portrayed as
simple reactionaries, blinded by self-interest or prejudice from seeing the value of new institutional forms.' 5 An industrializing Eng9. See N. GASH, MR. SECRETARY PEEL 500-06 (1961); see generally 2 L. RADZINOWICZ,
supra note 2.
10. A. BRIGGS, supra note 5, at 216; 13 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
266-68, 403 (1952).
11. C. PHILLIPSON, THREE CRIMINAL LAW REFORMERS 156 (1975); D. COOPER, THE LESSON OF THE SCAFFOLD 27-44 (1974).
12. R.K. WEBB, supra note 3, at 177-80 (1980); H. PERKIN, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN
ENGLISH SOCIETY 287-89 (1972).
13. C. PHILLIPSON, supra note 11, at 320-32. John Langbein, in a recent article, has also
adopted such a naively "presentist" perspective, describing "the legendary proponents of
reform" as offering "manifestly sensible" proposals. J. Langbein, Albion's Fatal Flaws, 98
PAST & PRESENT 115 (1983).
14. 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 2, at 318, 531-33.
15. Id. at 513-17; C. PHLLIPSON, supra note 11, at 280; J. Langbein, supra note 13, at
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land was faced with the crisis of a rising tide of criminal activity
which proved that traditional measures for preserving order were
outmoded. Radzinowicz describes the reformers as groping towards
some definitive answer to the complicated problem of law enforcement, as if they were scientists searching for a law that would resolve some natural riddle. He waits impatiently for the discovery of
the modern mix of mild punishments, professional police, and reformatory discipline to emerge.
Within this framework of assumptions, historians have nominated various candidates for the distinction of contributing most
to the reform effort. Among the Whig lawyers, Samuel Romilly was
the first to propose, in Parliament an extensive mitigation of the
severity of the law."' Henry Brougham gained a wide audience for
reform through his articles in the Edinburgh Review. 17 Robert
Peel, the Tory Home Secretary, appears in most accounts as the
sensible politician who contributed administrative skill and political caution to offset the intemperate zeal of men like Romilly. Norman Gash and Radzinowicz have written of their admiration for
Peel because he was far-sighted enough to link the reform of criminal law with the introduction of the new police.' 8 Behind these politicians stood the imposing presence of Jeremy Bentham, a man
whose intellectual powers seemed to dominate the age. Bentham
offered a withering critique of the principles of eighteenth-century
justice and proposed an alternative vision characterized by its unrelentingly logical conclusions. Most of the Whig lawyers were in
communication with Bentham, and even Peel admitted admiration
for him. Certainly, a strong case can be made for the argument
that Bentham was the fountain from which reform drew its
strength.1"
Yet, this argument about personalities and ideas somehow
misses the point. Douglas Hay has prepared the way for a more
sophisticated analysis by his sensitive description of the multifaceted character of the eighteenth-century legal system. The
115.
16. P. MEDD, ROMiLLY 210 (1968).
17. C. PHILLIPSON, supra note 11, at 237-332; T. Ford, English Criminal Law Reform
During and After the Napoleonic Wars, 7 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 243, 243-70 (1978).
18. N. GASH, supra note 9, at 329-30; J.E. COOKSON, LORD LIVERPOOL'S ADMINISTRATION
303-04 (1975).
19. C. PHILLIPSON, supra note 11, at 124-25, 233-34; E. HALEVY, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALISM 54-75 (1966).
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logic of the gallows lies in its relationships to power and the shape
of class society. "The criminal law," Hay observes, "was critically
important in maintaining bonds of obedience and deference, in legitimizing the status quo, in constantly recreating the structure of
authority which arose from property and in turn protected its interest.

20

So persuasive is Hay's account, that instead of sharing

Radzinowicz's impatience for reform, we are left to marvel that so
logical a system of justice, so intimately linked to existing political
arrangements, could so quickly be overthrown in the early nineteenth century.
B.

The Social Meanings of the Image of Justice

Even a casual reading of the parliamentary debates over reform suggests an explanation of change that challenges the traditional accounts at almost every turn. The opponents of reform
were reactionaries, but in a more profound sense than is usually
attributed to them. Benthamite language was employed in the debate over reform, but it did not provide the most persuasive arguments for change. Peel, Brougham, and Romilly all had important
parts to play in the dispute, but the outcome was not a matter of
one side simply convincing the other. Ultimately, the issue in dispute was not how to secure the greater efficiency of the criminal
justice system, but how to present a more pleasing image of justice.
The desire was not just to reduce crime but to secure wider support for the legal order. Both eighteenth-century and nineteenthcentury politicians were determined to sustain the idea that law
"was subject not to the whim of a capricious individual but to a set
of prescriptions that bound all members of the polity." 21 Radzinowicz supposes that reform of the criminal law awaited the reasonable administrative arrangements of better prisons and police.
On the contrary, the challenge to older principles of justice prepared the way for and justified the introduction of new forms of
state power.
Between 1808, when Samuel Romilly inaugurated his campaign for the mitigation of the criminal law, and 1836, when a bill
was passed granting defense counsel the right to address juries in
.20. D. Hay, Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL
(1975); see also AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE 14 (J. Brewer & J. Styles eds. 1980).
21. AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE, supra note 20, at 14.

TREE

25

19831

CRIMINAL LAW REFORM

felony cases, a debate took place which challenged eighteenth-century notions of justice and propounded a new conception of the
judicial process. In this debate, both sides appealed to justice as a
form of instruction, teaching lessons to a wider public. Lord Holland, a Whig supporter of criminal law reform, expressed his conviction that while the judicial process sought the truth in individual cases, another consideration was that truth should be arrived
at in a "manner satisfactory to the public. ' 22 In eighteenth-century
England, the image of a paternal judge presiding over a compassionate inquest into the details of individual cases seemed "satisfactory." To this the advocates of reform opposed the image of an
impersonal judge who refereed the clash of competing lawyers and
followed the prescriptions of a more sharply defined criminal code.
For the ultra-Tories who defended the former position, the discretion of the judge operated to legitimate a hierarchical and deferential society. 23 This mode of justice positively reinforced both the
idea and experience of personal relationships based upon inequality.24 In contrast, the Whigs who argued for reform sought to realize a more formal equality that would sustain belief in the operation of an impersonal and impartial rule of law. The eighteenthcentury criminal law had promised justice, but in a drama that vividly taught the lessons of hierarchy and place. The advocates of
reform were eager to overturn any practice that might create the
impression that inequality influenced the operation of the law.
These two opposing interpretations of criminal justice were
not merely opinions held by competing political parties; they represented two conflicting ideological constructions of the forms of
state power. Each form of justice, it will be argued here, acquired
its coherence from a particular understanding of the existing state
of class relations. The transformation from one form to another
was a result of a growing uneasiness with the image of aristocratic
justice and of a desire to suit the image of justice to a society
where a public, both middle and lower class, was putting forth new
claims to be heard. The early nineteenth century was a time of
22.

35 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 231 (1836).

23. See E.P. THOMPSON, Eighteenth-century English Society: Class Struggle Without
Class?, 3 Soc. HIST. 133, 133-65 (1978); E.P. THOMPSON, PatricianSociety, Plebeian Culture, 7 J. oF Soc. HIST. 382, 382-405 (1974).

24. See Hay, supra note 20, at 17-63; see also E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HuNTEns
(1975).
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turmoil and violence in England. The Whig lawyers who advocated
reform were peculiarly situated both with respect to the law and
the public so as to feel most acutely the urgency for action. Their
task was the delicate one of challenging a form of justice without
revealing the full limits of a class-bound law. This task was in part
flcilitated by a developing sense of a kind of incommensurability
between the two positions which manifested itself as the debate
went on. The triumph of liberal notions of justice necessarily involved the reinterpretation of aristocratic judicial practice so that
it appeared to produce injustice.
Various proposals for the mitigation of the criminal law were
justified by appeal to contemporary intellectual movements, including Whig political ideas, Benthamism, and standard Enlightenment concepts. A central contention of this Article is, however,
that the impulse for reform emerged from and was shaped by the
class position and experiences of Whig politicians. No reform "program" existed in advance, deduced from some rigid ideological
structure already in place. For the most part, the coherence of various reform measures appeared only after the fact. The logic of
reform efforts lay in the interaction of individuals possessing a certain stock of ideas and images with particular circumstances. This
is another way of saying that the situation in which the "left"
Whigs found themselves did more than provide a motive and occasion for action; it also suggested certain remedies. If the ideas they
employed were structured, they echoed the structure of a particular social world. The specific experience of social relations was not
incidental to the creation of the reform measures, but in various
ways helped to constitute those measures.
The task of providing a complete account of the social relationships involved in even so limited a reform as that discussed
here would be a daunting one. But the interaction of class and ideological structures can be well enough revealed by reference to the
parliamentary debates. These debates were usually conducted at a
high level of philosophical abstraction. Participants in the debates
often misrepresented both existing arrangements and the arguments of their opponents. Such claims as they made should not be
mistaken for a true description of the operation of justice in the
early nineteenth century. Misrepresentation and things said obliquely are, however, the substance of this Article and the key to
its method. They are revealing in their own right. The speeches of
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the Whig reformers were studded with references to class. Speakers asked their listeners to imagine themselves as part of a lower
class public "listening" to trials or "watching" an execution. Their
images provoked anxiety by suggesting the presence of a restless
and potentially hostile public. They warned of the dangers of a divided ruling class. The one thing they did not need to refer to was
popular unrest since these debates took place against a backdrop
of Luddism and Peterloo, Cato Street and the Bristol riots. They
self-consciously employed a highly charged language which linked
"discretion" and "mercy" to the discredited principles of aristocratic government, while promising "true" justice founded on the
25
'
more democratic principles of "certainty" and "humanity.
These images and phrases were put forth as a way of allaying class
hostility and restoring belief in the law. This Article seeks to capture the attitudes of the lawmakers through their own words and
to argue that their understanding of the nature of class relations
provided reasons which help us to explain their political actions.
II. THE

A.

MEANING OF THE

GALLows

The Reform Argument

In practical political terms, the debate over the severity of the
criminal law began in 1808 when Samuel Romilly proposed the abolition of the death penalty for stealing privately from the person.2" The speech in which he moved this measure contained a full
analysis of the inadequacy of the existing law. He presented arguments that were to be repeated with remarkable consistency for
the next thirty years, not only by himself but by all the major
Whig critics of the law's severity. For Romilly the evils in the contemporary judicial process originated in the frequency with which
death was prescribed by law for a wide variety of offenses. Since
the law was far too rigorous to be carried out in all cases, it had
become necessary to create some form of mitigation. The solution
that had emerged in the eighteenth century was the frequent em25. The debate over "discretion" and "certainty" did not end with the reforms of the
1830s. Yet, when discretion again became an issue it did not emerge in the same form and
certainly not in the context of a defense of aristocratic justice. But see L. Radzinowicz & R.
Hood, Judicial Discretion and Sentencing Standards: Victorian Attempts to Solve a Perennial Problem, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1288, 1288-99 (1979); D. Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1710-13 (1976).

26. 11

PARL. DEB.

(1st Ser.) 397 (1808).

100
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ployment of the royal pardon. The consequence of this action,
Romilly argued, was to produce a "total change... in the nature
of that which is considered as the most valuable prerogative of the
crown; the prerogative of shewing mercy. ' 27 Instead of choosing
the occasional object of mercy, the judges and ministers were now
engaged in selecting who was to be executed. They did this as personal habit and prejudice dictated, not on the basis of any settled
principle or rule. One judge might punish the most frequent offender, another the offense he regarded as most serious, while a
third always recommended the condemned as fit objects for
mercy. 28 Judicial discretion had grown ominously; Romilly feared
that justice had come to seem the product of individual will.29
Romilly argued that the evils arising from this practice were
manifold. The operation of the law created total uncertainty about
the punishment for any given offense. People convicted of the
same crime were punished in very different ways, and widely different offenses had the same punishment attached to them.30 The
public had no way of discovering the true reason for a particular
outcome. The judges, he said, had created a "lottery of justice." 31
When a sentence was pronounced it was far from clear that it
would be carried out. When a person was finally executed it was
often not on account of the specific offense for which he was convicted, but because bf personal reputation or government policy.
Thus, there was no clear lesson offered to the public. Most disturbing to Romilly was the idea that the jury was not involved in
making the crucial determinations in the case. He "thought the
discretionary power at present granted to the judges highly dangerous, and such as no men would desire to be vested with. 3 2 The
Whig critique of the law was that the existing judicial process was
uncertain, unjust, inefficient, and potentially tyrannical.

27. Id.
28. Id. at 398-400.
29. See id. at 397-98; see also 2 MEMOIS
(Shannon ed. 1971).
30. 11 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 397 (1808).
31.

OF THE Lian OF SIR SAMUEL ROMILLY

19 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 12 app. (1811).

32. 15 PARL. Dan. (Ist Ser.) 370 (1810).

336-37
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B. The Conservative Response: Discretionand Human
Authority
The task of answering an analysis which fundamentally challenged the existing system of law was taken up for the most part
by the judges and law officers of the Crown." No one rose to defend the severity of the law as such, though some argued that such
severity was a necessary reserve to justice. The more usual defense
offered was based less on the necessity of death than on the wisdom embodied in existing practice. Although William Windham
was not a law officer, he was a dedicated foe of all innovation and
had learned from Burke to distrust criticism of English institutions. To him the threat was that if Romilly's "principles were to
be adopted, and all discretion taken away, there would be an end
to that most amiable and endearing attribute of majesty, the power
of extending mercy."" Windham linked the principle of discretion
to the essence of monarchical government, for it was the unique
power of the king to deflect the full execution of the law.35 The
royal prerogative did not overturn the law, since the Crown could
not impose a more severe punishment. But the wise mitigation of
the law was the suitable occupation of the king. According to one
judge, the pardon "holds up the sovereign to the subject in the
most favorable light," and thereby bound the sympathies of the
people to the government.3 The solicitor general, Thomas Plumer,
remarked in an 1810 debate that the reform of the criminal law
aimed at discrediting "the whole body of the criminal law," and
tried "to cut up by the root all discretion in the judges. ' 7 The
Tories found it to their advantage to argue that Romilly dealt in
dangerous abstractions, despite his claim that he desired only
piecemeal reforms. Beneath Romilly's pleasing "theories," they detected a program to undermine royal power. 8 Windham thought
such philosophical schemes for perfecting human society had produced such evil in France that England should be protected from
33. On the political role of the judges, see E. HALEvY, ENGLAND IN 1815, at 25-32 (1968).
34. 15 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 372-73 (1810); 2 ROMILLY, supra note 29, at 322; 3 ROMILLY,
supra note 29, at 71-72.
35. 15 PARL. DEn. (1st Ser.) 372 (1810).
36. REPORT FROM THE SELEcT COMMITTEE ON THE CRIMINAL LAw RELATING TO CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 47 (1819) [hereinafter cited as SacT CoMmrrrEE REPORT].
37.

15 PARL. Dan. (1st Ser.) 373 (1810).

38.

See 16 PARL. DaB. (lst Ser.) 775 (1810); 19 PARL. DaB. (1st Ser.) 22 app. (1811).
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the contagion:
He could not help looking with an eye of jealousy on all such visionary
schemes, which had humanity and justice for their ostensible causes. What
had we witnessed within the last twenty years? Had not the French Revolution begun with the abolition of capital punishments in every case; but not
till they had sacrificed their sovereign, whom they had thus made the grand
finale to this species of punishment. 39

Tory defenders of the law challenged the theoretical and
moral claims made by the Whigs. They doubted that any significant measure of certainty could ever be established in the award of
punishments. Each individual case was unique. It would be naive
and unjust to attempt to force individual considerations into a precise scale of offenses and punishments. Given this, the Tory Prime
Minister Perceval asked, where could the discretion that must inevitably belong to the law best be placed? His immediate response
was that "if discretion were to be left in any quarter, he did not
know where it could more safely be vested than with the judges. "40
They were more reliable in their exercise of a discretionary power
than any jury could ever be because they were the repository for
the wisdom and humanity of the English judicial process. When
one considered what description of persons composed juries, it was
"obvious" that they were more susceptible to movements in popular sentiment. The judges were the bedrock upon which the institution of justice rested. Davies Giddy spoke for many Tories:
"When the House considered the manner in which the judges,...
for many years past, were selected from a description of person
against whom no reflection could lie, he was persuaded that it
would be evident the discretion could no where be better placed. '41
The usual route to judicial eminence was through service as a law
officer of the Crown, and this apprenticeship assured the judge's
loyalty in troubled times. Juries embodied a more democratic principle that rendered them less reliable. They were not "enlightened
enough to discern and decide upon the actual merits, upon a com'42
prehensive view of all the circumstances of each case."
39. 16 PARL. DEB. (lst Ser.) 768 (1810).
40. 15 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 373-74 (1810).
41. 16 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 767 (1810).
42. Id. See also E. HALEvy, supra note 33 at 114-15. On discretion and deference, see
Parlimentary Select Committee, Report from the Select Committee on Criminal Laws, 24
Q. REV., 195, 239-40 (1820-21).

CRIMINAL LAW REFORM

1983]

C. Discretion and Humanity
The defenders of traditional judicial arrangements were especially stung by the charges that the existing laws were inhumane.
After all, they were defending the mercy that was the centerpiece
of justice; the reformers sought to remove mercy by substituting
"mechanical" certainty. Judicial discretion and mercy were inextricably linked. Discretion, Windham argued, "arises out of the nature of things; it may, possibly, be productive of some inconvenience; but it is an inconvenience to which mankind must
submit. '4 3 It was also an "inconvenience" that provided the occasion for so noble a virtue as mercy. Yet Romilly now aimed to
overthrow discretion and to challenge necessity. An inflexible and
invariable code of punishments would leave little room for mercy:
"Modern legislators, convinced of their own omniscience, are fully
able to provide for every possible contingency; with them discretion is useless; and the words pardon and mercy, are, for the sake
of humanizing our national character, to be abolished: but not with
my consent ....

""

For Windham there was too much inhuman-

ity in the "humanity" of the law reformers, who struggled to fit
multifaceted human existence into prescribed categories. He saw
social revolution in the efforts to abolish "the words pardon and
45
mercy."
The benign and personalized character of current practice was
emphasized by Colonel William Frankland in 1811 in one of the
most sustained defenses of the law. He took Romilly's five proposals for reform that year as clear proof of a program to transform
"the whole system of the law."4 He, on the other hand, was content with the balance that "the British system" had achieved, "a
system full of mercy, though seemingly severe." 47 He argued that
as a practicing magistrate he was better informed about the actual
operation of the law: "I do not mean their mere bearings and workings in courts of justice: but how they operate upon the mind; how
they interweave themselves with manners; how they school and educate the rising generation; how they form character-And they do
43.

19 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 63 app. (1811).

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 59 app.
Id.
Id. at 615.
Id. at 616.
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form character-national character."4
Frankland voiced other fears as well. Reform would operate to
limit the contact between what he called the "moral code" and the
law by allowing no room for the operation of practical moral judgment. Such moral judgment was exercised by individuals, not dictated by law. Reform would make justice more mechanical, and
thereby less moral. "Nothing is entrusted to wise and good men,"4
Frankland observed of the reforms. "Even pardon is excluded from
the theories of those speculators, who considering pardon as a dispensing with the law, would tear this jewel from the British
crown." 50 The beauty of the British system was that the "human
law" was "qualified in its application by the moral law, so that it
falls with severity on those only, who, morally speaking, are fit objects of it." 51 Judges served as the sanction against the tyranny of
mere laws. Yet what was this mechanical principle of certainty that
was meant to displace the morally grounded law?
Frankland believed that any practical thinker would realize
that certainty depended upon an implausible series of events: certainty of detection, quick prosecution, good evidence, and "clearness of understanding" on the part of judges and jury.5 2 This was
too much to expect. Human laws could never be perfect and could
not perfect human action, but human institutions could work reliably, balancing and compensating for human imperfections. Severe
laws, wide judicial discretion, and mercy constituted a system that
was wise; it was a system based on experience and history, not
speculation. Such a system was in harmony with English character.
Small gradations of punishment only enfeebled moral judgment
and inhibited freedom, thus destroying the free and "manly" character bf English life. 3 Frankland concluded by borrowing the language of the Whig law reformers to condemn their efforts:
The system which attempts to affix prespectively an exact punishment to an
exact offense, antecedently endeavoring to define every shade of distinction
which a case may receive from its circumstances, trusting nothing to the discretion of the wise and the good, and thus presumptuously making the
human code all in all hardens men's hearts, and destroys all moral
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

617.
627.
627-28.
632-33.
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The central figure in the Tory version of justice was the judge.
He was the human "governor" who kept the judicial system in balance. One attorney general, Charles Wetherall, expressed the view
that a code of laws could not but be cold and harsh, but the judges
were actuated by feelings of tenderness and "humanity." 55 Judges
such as Lord Eldon and Lord Ellenborough hastened to add their
own testimony to support this view.5 6 They bitterly resented what

they saw as attacks upon their conduct. Ellenborough sought to
show that the judges were conscientious in their fulfillment of their
legally prescribed role. They presided over trials in a spirit of moderation, warned against vindictive prosecutions, reminded the jury
of its duty, and presented the defendant's case in the strongest
possible light. When necessary, they could also recommend "the
royal mercy.

'5 7

In answer to examples of injustice offered by the

opposition, the defenders of the law presented cases where the
strict execution of the law had properly been set aside in the interest of mercy. Garrow cited the case of one poor prisoner, an industrious tailor, who stole a piece of wood to make stools of it for his
sick children:
Such was the feeling of the judge, after having heard all the heart-rendering
circumstances, that he instantly and rapidly said to the prisoner--'I hope
your appearance here will be of no detriment to you hereafter-it ought not
to be-you have suffered much already-go hence, and bless the laws which
have enabled the judge to exercise some discretion on your case.'5 8

It was with such cases in mind that Wetherall said that he favored
the humanity of Lord Ellenborough over "all the speculative writers, the Voltaires and Rousseaus included."5 9
D.

Discretion and Social Unrest

The debate over the criminal laws took place against a background of civil unrest. The years between 1808 and 1836 were some
54. Id. at 646.
55.
56.

25 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 374 (1813).
See 19 PARL.DEB. (1st Ser.) 112-13 app. (1811).

57. See id. at 121-22 app. Tenterden asked in 1832 why a punishment so seldom inflicted should not be praised for its effectiveness rather than condemned. 13 PARL. DEB. (3d

Ser.) 986 (1832).
58.
59.

24 PARL. DES. (1st Ser.) 569 (1813).
25 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 373 (1813).
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of the most turbulent in English history. They saw the conclusion
of the war against France, the industrial unrest associated with
Luddism, various movements for parliamentary reform, the
Peterloo Massacre, the Cato Street conspiracy, the Swing riots,
and the alarms surrounding the passage of the Reform Bill.60 The

criminal statistics, first collected in 1805, revealed a rising flood of
indictable offenses. Their number grew from 4,605 in 1805 to
18,107 by 1830.61 The two periods when agitation over the criminal
laws was most intense were the years before 1822 and the years of
the Reform Bill crisis, 1830 through 1832. The former period included what E. P. Thompson has called "the heroic age of popular
Radicalism. ' '6

2

Both were periods of severe economic dislocation.

The Tories, for obvious reasons, did not feel that these were
times in which one should criticize or seek to disarm justice. Judicial discretion was a powerful weapon in the hands of the government for securing the good order of the country. 3 In the debate
over the question of establishing a committee to investigate the operation of the criminallaws in 1819, this Tory alarm was clearly
expressed. Castlereagh attempted to control the inquiry by linking
it to a study of secondary punishments. But the Whig Mackintosh
successfully called for a separate investigation by a committee
heavy with the advocates of reform. 4 In the debate, Castlereagh
found himself on the defensive in trying to vindicate the English
system of law. He sought to show "that as it was the policy, so it
had also been the practice to administer that law, not in justice
only, but in mercy."6 5 He cautioned that others must
abstain from viewing our criminal code abstractly-to abstain from presenting it to the public as possessing a sanguinary character which did not belong
60. For a survey of the extent of these "disturbances," see generally E.J. HOBSBAWM &

G. RUDE,

CAPTAIN SWING

(1968). For a more traditional account, see F.

DARVALL, DISTUR-

(1934).
See V.A.C. Gatrell & T.B. Hadden, Criminal Statistics and Their Interpretation,

BANCE AND PUBLIC ORDER IN REGENCY ENGLAND

61.

in NINETEENTH CENTURY SocIETY: ESSAYS IN THE USE OF QUANTITATIVE METHODS FOR THE
STUDY OF SociAL DATA 392 (E.A. Wrigley ed. 1972).

62. E.P. THOMPSON, supra note
supra note 12, at 209-10.

5, at 603; A. BRIGGS, supra note 5, at 208; H. PERKIN,

63. In the 1820s Peel undertook to consolidate the criminal laws and in the process
mitigated some of their severity. He was careful, however, to leave the discretion of the
judges untouched. See N. GASH, supra note 9, at 486-87; see generally 1 L. RAnzINowlcz,
supra note 7, at 567-77 (unequal application of reformers).
64. 39 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 751 (1819).
65. Id.
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to its practice-to abstain from dwelling on those severe influctions that he
might find in its theory, but which he would never find in its execution."

To graduate punishments would "deprive mercy of that province
in which it was at present exercised so much to the public advantage. 11 7 The pardon was not employed to correct some mischief in
the law; "mercy" was a regular principle of social relations.0 8 A
note of desperation entered Castlereagh's speech as he watched the
tide of legal reform advance:
[H]e once more begged to deprecate any attempt on this subject to influence
the passions of the multitude, by persuading them, that instead of living, as it
had been represented to them by their ancestors they lived, under a mild and
merciful government, they were to learn for the first time that the law of
England was the most sanguinary code on earth .... 61

E. Reform and the Politics of Authority
While the Tories often mentioned their troubled times, the
advocates of reform seldom referred directly to popular unrest. Instead, they remained persistent in their advocacy of reform in the
face of the most alarming predictions. Yet, in private, Sydney
Smith wrote to Lord Grey in 1819 to recommend "anything that
would show the government to the people in some other attitude
than that of taxing, punishing, and restraining. "70 Criminal law reform was a logical and convenient issue for the Whigs. The attack
on judicial discretion was consistent with the historic Whig advocacy of the rule of law, and a sensitivity to the popular perception
of justice had been inherited from the Wilkite movement of the
1760s.7 1 In a period when Tory repression was created by law officers and the courts were employed in politically motivated prosecutions, the arguments for mitigation of the criminal code provided
a way to criticize the government.7 2 The emotions associatied with
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Hay, supra note 20, at 40-49.
69.
70.
71.

39 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 753 (1810).
1 THE LmErERs OF SYDNEY SMrrH 341 (N. Smith ed. 1953).
AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE, supra note 20, at 136, 146, 149, 157-58, 160, 169-70.

72. The opposition was quick to accuse the government of causing needless suffering
when large numbers of condemned were left in Newgate awaiting the outcome of appeals "to
the'fountain of mercy." The government was portrayed as failing in its duty to decide
quickly on the fate of so many unhappy persons. The unpopular Prince Regent also was
criticized for failing to attend to "the most solemn act of royalty." 18 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.)
831-33 (1811); 11 PARL. DEB. (2d Ser.) 902-10 (1824); 38 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 960 (1818); 33
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this issue were such that criminal law reform was one of the few
topics that united a badly splintered party. Criminal law reform
was an issue on which the ministers were uniquely vulnerable, both
on moral and utilitarian grounds. 3
Above all, these measures spoke of the traditional Whig preoccupation with public opinion. The Tories accused them of appealing to the "factious and unreasonable clamor" out of doors, 74 but
Francis Horner saw reform as a way of challenging the popularity
of the "democratic" party.7 5 Humanitarian issues in general offered
the basis for "a broad political alliance" of the middle and lower
classes, 7 but the law was a special area of concern. As one prominent Whig expressed the sentiment, it was not "enough that a system of criminal law should be really just and impartial; it ought to7
be fully impressed on the minds of the people that it was so."
The Whigs assumed in debate that they had a deeper understand78
ing of social change and so a better remedy for social unrest. If
the problem with ensuring loyalty to the law on the part of the
public arose from too severe a punishment and too much judicial
discretion, then the solution was to diminish the severity and radically circumscribe discretion. As James Mackintosh pointed out,
timely reform of the criminal law had helped to increase Napoleon's popularity.79 At a time when the social order was being challenged by political radicals, Whig law reformers reinterpreted the
issue of legitimacy in their own terms and offered their own
solutions.
The popularity of criminal law reform came in part from its
PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 418-20, 536-40 (1816); 35 PARL. DEB. (lst Ser.) 404-08, 503-05 (1817).

73. See A. MITCHELL, THE WHIGS IN OPPOSITION, 1815-1830, at 15, 21, 121 (1967); M.
ROBERTS, THE WHIG PARTY, 1807-1812, at 110-40 (1939); 2 ROMILLY, supra note 29, at 391;
16 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 834 (1810). It is striking that even in the face of Luddism the
government felt compelled to apologize for creating a new capital statute; see 21 PARL. DEB.
(1st Ser.) 810-11 (1812); see also J. MERIVALE, A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN
BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT UPON AMENDMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 20-21 (1811).
74.

39 PARL. DEB. (lst Ser.) 837 (1819).

75.

2 MEMOIRS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF FRANCIS HORNER 11, 89 (L. Homer ed.
1853)(letter to Dugald Stewart, Esq.).
76. R. ZEGGER, JOHN CAm HOEHOUSE: A POLITICAL LIFE, 1819-1852, at 167 (1973); accord A.

ASPINALL, LORD BROUGHAM AND THE WHIG PARTY

31, 42 (1927); D. Rapp, The Left-

Wing Whigs: Whitbread, the Mountain and Reform, 1809-1815, 21 J. BRIT. STUD. 35, 35-61
(1982).
77. 11 PARL. DEE. (2d Ser.) 186 (1824).

78.
79.

See J. CLIVE, MACAULAY, THE SHAPING OF THE HISTORIAN 134-38 (1975).
2 MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH 57-58 (R. Mackintosh ed. 1836).

1983]

CRIMINAL LAW REFORM

being defined as a constitutional issue. A government policy of repression of radical political movements cast the Whigs in the role
of defenders of traditional English liberties. Lord Holland expressed this connection when he voiced his anxiety that the criminal law involved "the mere exercise of a discretionary power." He
was, he said, "unwilling to vest, in such frequent instances, a power
over the lives of their fellow creatures, in any individuals, however
highly he might respect them."8 0 Lord Lansdowne believed such
discretion led to abuse, was not sanctioned by statute, and was a
power dangerous to the constitution. 1 Homer reported that "[iln
the best works on jurisprudence it had always been laid down as a
principle, that although the quantum of punishment might sometimes be left to the discretion of the judges, the description of it
should always be regulated by the law." 82 Yet present practice
"substituted the exception for the general rule."8 3 Indeed, one
could argue that the jury was no longer a defense of English liberties. Whigs emphasized that recent innovations had undermined
the ancient purity of trial by jury. Romilly pointed out that openness and publicity in judicial proceedings had been sacrificed." For
Mackintosh the discretionary system was "at variance with the
first principles of free government ... none of the facts or circumstances on which the life or death of man depends were ever
known to the mere spectators of those public proceedings and solemn trials." 85 Instead life and death depended upon an investigation by a "secret body."8 " The Evangelical Thomas Fowell Buxton
found it ironic that "the people of England," who prided themselves "upon nothing so much as that we are governed not by will,
but by law," had to be "protected from the rigor of our own law by
'8
the interference of the ministers of the Crown. 7

80. 20 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 298 (1811). See generally A. Kreigel, Liberty and Whiggery
in Early Nineteenth-Century England, 52 J. MOD. HIST. 253 (1980).
81. 19 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 115 app. (1811).
82. 27 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 247-48 (1814).

83. Id.
84. 19 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 12, 76 (1811).
85. 24 PARL. DEB. (2d Ser.) 1039 (1830).
86.

See id. at 1040; see also 17 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 170 (1833).

87. 39 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 813 (1819).
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F. The "Abuse" of PersonalJustice
The advocates of reform tried to make clear that they did not
complain of mercy, but rather of the way in which the prerogative
of mercy was abused. The fact that it was so frequently necessary
to have recourse to mercy meant that the laws lacked humanity.
Certainty, impartiality, and equality before the law, were attributes of a well-regulated system of laws. A striking characteristic of
the criminal law debate was that both sides shared a common
description of the current process of the law. They might have long
disagreements over the significance of criminal statistics, but they
agreed that judicial discretion was the operative principle of the
system. Where they differed so sharply was over the value to be
attached to such discretion-whether it met the requirements of
justice and utility. This disagreement was starkly revealed in 1823
in an exchange between Mackintosh and the home secretary, Robert Peel. According to Mackintosh:
[T]he selection of a particular case for punishment depended upon circumstances the most fluctuating and unsteady; such, perhaps, as the particular

temper and opinions of the judge, the peculiar necessity which might exist for
making a single example in some particular district, or the importunities
which might be made to the judge for the purpose of protecting property, on
his leaving the assize town. All these were circumstances which might influence the administration of justice at the particular moment, but which, considered with reference to general principles of criminal law, he could not but
regard as a complete abomination. That the life of a man should depend on a
temporary or local policy, on the necessities of a particular district, or the
interests of particular classes, was a principle utterly inconsistent with justice
and humanity, and tending to confound all our notions of right and wrong.8

Mackintosh believed that individual right stood above social
necessity, especially insofar as some individual judge presumed to
determine necessity. Yet eighteenth-century writers had praised
just those aspects of judicial process Mackintosh now condemned.
Eighteenth-century justice had emphasized personal elements, the
personal discretion vested in the judge, the personality of the defendant, the individual characteristics of the crime, and the peculiar situation of the community. Peel admitted that "[i]t might be
hard to say to a man, that his life should be valued at a particular
rate, depending upon local or temporary expediency. But this was
88.

See 9 PARL. DEB. (2d Ser.) 411 (1823).
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the very reasoning upon which law was founded."8 9 An execution
might well be a necessary measure in a time of social discontent,
while mercy might more properly be awarded in peaceful times.
This was not unjust; it was a recognition of the wider context
within which justice operated.9 0
A basic argument for reform maintained that the mitigation of
the law was not only unjust but inefficient; increasing uncertainty
both enfeebled law enforcement and provided an incentive to
criminals. The severe laws caused the public to refrain from prosecution and conviction of the accused. They feared the responsibility of taking a human life. Quite simply, prosecutors and jurors did
not trust the judges in their promise to act mercifully. Mackintosh
argued that the public did not see the use of the pardon as a part
of the normal operation of the law, but rather interpreted it as a
symptom of the profound disorganization of justice itself. Its most
alarming aspect was that human life depended on mere human discretion and not the certainty of established rules.9 " The frequent
appeal to mercy was not taken as a justification for the existing
system, but a reason for its overthrow. This interpretation prevailed despite the explicit denials of those who exercised discretion. The very actions of the judges were described as more dispositive of their dislike of severity, despite their testimony to the
92
contrary.
89. Id. at 424.
90. Id. Thus, the testimony of both Mackintosh and Peel lends support to Hay's
description of eighteenth-century judicial policy. Langbein's criticism of Hay confuses the
relationship between belief and practice, and in a related sense, between theory and empirical evidence. Langbein appeals to common sense; the criminal law was only concerned with
criminals, and we all know criminals are "marginal" citizens. Therefore, the ruling class
could only have had a slight interest in the criminal law. The criminal justice system "was
primarily designed to protect the people." J. Langbein, supra note 13, at 105. He proves his
case by examining a range of cases which, for the most part, concern people who were not of
the ruling class. What Langbein's article reveals to us is the danger of deducing belief from
behavior, for then we run the risk of imposing our perception and values upon the past in
our construction of the facts. Langbein's "common sense" makes it difficult to understand
the intensity of the early nineteenth-century debate over the criminal law. Both conservatives and reformers believed that a system of justice existed. Neither side was in doubt that
the criminal law was important. It was seen as a form of instruction to all of society about
the legitimacy of constituted authority. Langbein's claim as to the peripheral character of
the criminal law would have amazed individuals as diverse as Eldon, Bentham, Romilly, and
Wilberforce. Id. at 119.
91. See 39 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 783-84 (1819).
92. See 24 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 564-65 (1812-13).
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The Authority of the Middle Class

G.

The advocates of reform pounced on every irregularity in the
practice of the law as they hammered away at the theme that the
criminal law was illogical, impractical, and ineffective. Since current practice was based upon the normality of a distinction between law and practice, ludicrous examples were easy to find. Witnesses for reform cited one case where judge and jury cooperated
to value five ten pound notes at thirty-nine shillings. 3 In a case
where a drawer was broken open and a five pound bank note
taken, the jury returned a verdict of theft against the accused, but
not in a dwelling house, which would have been a capital offense."'
The jury thus implied "that the note and the man were accomplices-the note breaks open the drawer, passes through the doors,
finds its way into the street, and there is met by the prisoner."9 5
The advocates of reform made much of such pious perjury as a
way of demonstrating that evasions of the law could not be normal
practice. From such episodes they built a case for the unpopularity
of the laws. Juries revolted against carrying out the law, and even
judges conspired in such abuses. That remarkable bit of propagandizing, the 1819 report of the Select Committee in the Criminal
Law (the result of Castlereagh's defeat), repeatedly sought testimony that people refused to prosecute because of the severity of
the law." When the Tories responded that the failure to prosecute
sprang from a variety of different motives, such as time or expense,
the Committee sought to prove that such failures had only
"honourable" sources. 7 Indeed, the advocates of reform were engaged in a double task. First, they had to support their charges
against the law by their own testimony and that of the numerous
petitions they submitted. Second, they had to answer Tory charges
that this reluctance to carry out the law was a shirking of their
duty to society. They responded by an appeal to humanity as the
93.

See 5 PARL. DEB. (2d Ser.) 945 (1921).

94. Id. at 946.
95. Id.
SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 36, at 26.
97. The Report concluded that there was a marked reluctance to prosecute because of
the severity of the laws. Actual testimony before the Committee was ambiguous. Some witnesses reported no reluctance to prosecute; others disagreed, but only after considerable
prodding by the questioner. Still others gave different reasons for the supposed reluctance
to prosecute. See SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 36, at 26-27, 29, 50, 54, 86, 113.
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higher justification for their actions. They did not doubt the humanity of the judges, but they found such personal discretion unreliable. So in deference to a more noble sentiment, the cherishing
of human life, they refused to prosecute. Thus, the equation which
linked severity of the laws with uncertainty of punishment was not
only convincingly proved, but also justified.
H.

A Dangerous Sympathy

Underlying the arguments about the inefficiency and unconstitutionality of the judicial process was a more fundamental criticism. The fatal flaw in the existing system was its lack of accord
with popular sentiment. Mackintosh believed it "one of the greatest evils which can befall a country when the criminal law and the
virtuous feeling of the community are in hostility to each other.""8
The result was that the law could not be enforced without tyrannical measures. "[P]rosecutors, witnesses, counsel, juries, judges, and
the advisors of the Crown" all conspired to prevent justice from
being carried out.99 In fact, the discretion of the people had risen
up to limit the discretion of the judges. 10 0 The proof of this charge
was before everyone's eyes. Members of Parliament reported their
reluctance to prosecute, and Mackintosh had the signatures of
bankers, merchants, jurors, and other respectable members of the
community. The well-organized petitioning campaigns among the
middle class provided the incontrovertible evidence the law reformers needed. 10' "Is it fitting," Mackintosh asked, "that a system
should continue, which the whole body of the intelligent commu'10 2
nity combine to resist, as a disgrace to our nature and nation?
There was always a double edge to the Whig interpretation of
popular attitudes. The reluctance to prosecute was a symptom of
the disordered state of law, but it was also a kind of threat of what
98. 39

PARL. DEB.

(1st Ser.) 784 (1819); see also 5

PARL. DEB.

(2d Ser.) 930 (1821)

(Buxton's argument that "[o]ne presumption runs throughout the whole of our law; namely,
that it will be enforced by the people").
99. 39 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 789 (1819).
100. MERIVALE, supra note 73, at 34. For further evidence of the popular hostility towards judges, see E. BULWER-LYTTON, CLIFFORD, (1830) (painting a bleak portrait of English
justice and of a cruel judge). For Tenterden's angry reaction to such usurpation on the part
of juries, see 6 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 1181 (1831).
101. 39 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 81-84 (1819) ("this disinclination to enforce the law ...
extends to the learned judges").
102. Id. at 789.
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would happen if reform was not forthcoming. How else could one
interpret petitions from jurors which reported their unwillingness
to see capital sentences returned? A petition in 1831 from 1,100
current and potential jurors in Middlesex seemed to condone pious
perjuries. 1°3 Middle class opinion was expressing a refusal to participate in aristocratic justice both in principle and for practical
reasons. There was little enthusiasm for discretionary principles of
government which excluded the middle classes, and there was concern about lower class reactions to severity. This opinion also represented itself as something like a natural force. For Buxton it was
a power which "annuls and abrogates" the law.104 The Whig attorney general, William Home, alluded to a "human feeling" which
"was beyond legislative control, and could not be trifled with."10'5
Such ideas were used by the 1819 Committee as justifications for
examining merchants and bankers rather than judges about the effects of the law; the practical authority of the former was greater.
The judges could only express their own desire to cling to power,
while the respectable middle class represented a wider and more
disinterested force.106
The ultimate sanction for reform was the attitude of the people themselves. George Sinclair called upon Parliament to bow to
the verdict of a superior tribunal: "[By this] I mean the verdict of
public opinion, which has loudly and unequivocally pronounced
upon the penal code, as it stands in the statute book, a sentence of
103. 6 PARL. DEE. (3d Ser.) 1172-76 (1831). It is important in this context to note that
juror qualifications had been reformed by Peel in 1825. See 12 PAHL. DEE. (2d Ser.) 966-72
(1823). The petitioning campaign was well organized. During 1831 and 1832, as part of Basil
Montagu's and William Allen's campaign for law reform, one reprint of William Meredith's
1777 speech on the criminal law went through five editions for a total of 145,000 copies. The
pamphlet was only one of a number that were distributed by the Society for the Diffusion of
Information on the Subject of Capital Punishment. It contained detailed instruction for the
collection and submission of petitions.
104. 39 PARL. DEE (1st Ser.) 812 (1819).
105. 14 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 970 (1832); see also THE HOLLAND HOUSE DIARIES, 1831-40,
at 195 (A. Kriegel ed. 1977) (citing Brougham's observation that "the feelings of the pious,
the tender, and the just portion of Mankind have always and will always revolt at all disproportionate severity and above all at capital punishments for offences created entirely by the
artificial laws of society").
106. 5 PARL. DEB. (2d Ser.) 966-67 (1821) (Mackintosh here "would take the liberty of
saying. . . that he would prefer the testimony of bankers and merchants to the mere declarations of the learned gentlemen"); see also SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 36, at 9;
MERIVALE, supra note 73, at 23-24.
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indignant condemnation.

' 10 7

At times, public opinion appeared in

Whig arguments not just as a force of which a wise ruler took account, but as a source of legitimate authority to which legislators
were bound to listen. The reason for the confusion was that the
Whigs did in fact refer to two "publics." One was a middle class
"public" composed of bankers and merchants who were reluctant
to prosecute. The other "public" was more obscurely referred to by
the 1831 Middlesex petition: "Where public opinion does not go
along with the laws, the persons who suffer under them are regarded as the victims of legislative tyranny or judicial caprice, and
not as criminals, whose doom has been pronounced by the voice of
dispassionate justice."'' 0 This more inclusive "public" went by the
name of the "people," and it was for their "benefit," ultimately,
that the law existed. Justice was a lesson offered to them.
I. The Lesson of the Law
Prudence dictated then that legislators study what lessons
were being learned by the people. Here the Whigs found cause for
alarm. England had a code
which turns the tide of popular feeling into the most pernicious channel in
which it can possibly run; since it enlists the general sympathy on the side of
the malefactor, and transfers the indignation of the people from the crime
against which it ought to be directed, to the law by which that crime may be

punished. 10 9

In a dangerous way the law created "martyrs." 110 As proof, the advocates of reform reported the testimony of prisoners that even
they accepted the necessity of death in cases of violence, but they
rebelled against hanging for property offenses. The radical William
Ewart made the fateful connection: "A too severe Criminal Code,
then, produced a set of men ever ready to act as the advancedguard of anarchy and of revolution.""' In an age of social unrest,
the Whigs made clear their belief that the task of the law was not
repression but winning the loyalty of the people. Current practice
embittered its victims without creating a feeling of awe in its spectators. Sentencing fifty or sixty to death when only three or four
107.
109.

39 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 904 (1819).
PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 1172-76 (1831).
39 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 905 (1819).

110.
111.

Id.
11 PARL. DEB.

108. 6

(3d Ser.)

951 (1832).
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would actually be executed created an idle "mockery," a mere formality, degrading the character of the law itself.1 12 Such justice did
not frighten the vicious, but it did create the impression among the
people that justice was accidental. Far from being a defense of society, the Whigs believed that the criminal law had become a
threat to stability.
Certainty and true justice would be produced by arranging the
laws so that everyone knew exactly what would happen to someone
who acted in an illegal manner. The psychology was sounder; it
represented the clear association of act and punishment. The public image was also more satisfactory. The trial was simply a setting
for the determination of guilt or innocence. The convicted individual would in a literal sense have brought down the punishment on
his own head, because he knew in advance the exact consequence
of his actions. For this to be true, it was necessary that the action
and not the character of the accused be on trial. The goal was to
rout the personal from the courtroom, whether in the shape of the
judge or the accused. Romilly wanted to avoid any suggestion that
justice depended on personal whim or emotional factors.113 William

Grant, the only judge to support one of Romilly's motions, wanted
a system where pardons were the great exception, not the rule. For
him, acceptable discretion did not include discretion "going to life
or death, but merely of proportioning the gradations
of a certain
4
sort of punishment to the gradations of crimes.

11

The object of reform was to remove any hint that either judge
or minister chose the victims of the law. According to Romilly, a
well-defined code would show that there was "no selection of objects for punishment, in those who administer the law; the law itself has made the selection."115 Justice would no longer weave together personal relations on the basis of patronage in a hierarchical
society; the law would draw its strength from the fact that it represented the sentiments of society. Mackintosh said his object was
"to make the laws popular, to reconcile public opinion to their en112.

39 PAPJ.. DEB. (Ist Ser.) 841 (1819); see also 25 PAL. DEB. (Ist Ser.) 376-77 (1813)

("in not more than one case in twenty was the sentance carried into execution").
113. 16 PARL.DEB. (lst Ser.) 778-79 (1810). Discretion had also provided a resource for
the accused, so in a sense certainty was meant to disarm the defendant. See AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE, supra note 20, at 19.

114.
115.

16 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 770 (1810).
19 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 22 app. (1811).
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actments, and thus to redeem their character."""6 The legitimacy
and the effectiveness of the law both derived from the consent of
the public, not in any narrow legislative sense, but as a kind of
emotional sanction. 117 The law was "the great bond of society; the
point at which authority and obedience meet most nearly."'1 8 The
absence from the Whig argument of any demand for a new police
takes on meaning here. The Whigs did not want to increase the
power of government; they believed that reuniting sentiment and
law was all that was needed." 9 The popularity of the law would
ensure that prosecutions and convictions were forthcoming, and
the certainty of conviction would powerfully deter criminals. As a
result, life, liberty and property would all be more secure.2 0
III.

THE MEANING

OF Tim

TRIAL

The struggle to create a new meaning for justice included
more than a reduction in the severity of the criminal law. The rise
of the prison was a part of this movement.' 2' But the most impor-

tant and immediately related was the proposal to grant defense
counsel the right to address juries. In England during the early
nineteenth century, defense counsel had the right to address legal
questions arising during the trial and to cross-examine witnesses,
but in felony cases counsel was denied the right to summarize the
case for the accused before the jury.1 22 An anomaly in the law was
that defense counsel had that right in cases of treason and misdemeanor. In 1821, Richard Martin, a frequent advocate of humanitarian causes, proposed that this right be extended to the accused
in the case of felonies.'23 He suggested that giving prisoners such a
right was based on propositions "so self-evident" that they did not
require argument. 1 24 The present practice was "inconsistent" with
the supposed benevolence of English practice. 125 Mackintosh sup-

ported the bill, saying that it would only provide safeguards to the
116.
117.
118.
119.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

39 PARL. DEB. (1st Ser.) 797 (1819).
Id.
Id. at 798.
See GASH, supra note 9, at 313; see also CLIVE, supra note 78, at 92-95.
SELECT COMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 36, at 99.
See IGNATIEFF, supra note 8, especially chs. 5-6.
See 9 PARL. DEB. (2d Ser.) 200 (1824).
4 PARL. DEB. (2d Ser.) 945 (1821).
Id.
Id.
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accused already found reasonable in treason trials. It struck him as
peculiar that defense counsel should be permitted the right of addressing juries in misdemeanors,
but not in a trial in which some126
one's life was at stake.

A.

The Judge as Friend

In opposition to this reform stood one of the most venerable
beliefs of the English law: "At present, the court was counsel for
the prisoner," and it did not appear "that within the last century
any disadvantage had resulted."'1 2 7 Once again the personal author-

ity of the judge was established as the sanction to see that justice
was done to the accused. One Tory reported that he knew of no
"case in which the judge did not act as counsel for the prisoner.'

128

As with the discretion exercised in the award of punishment, the
belief that the judge was the prisoner's counsel created a connection between the judge and the accused which reinforced deference. Not surprisingly, John Copley, the future Lord Lyndhurst,
had only the highest praise for the existing mode of establishing
truth in a criminal trial:
Nothing could be conceived more impartial, cool and considerate than the
proceedings in courts of criminal justice. There could be no course more en-

tirely favorable to the development of the truth. The greatest order, no extraordinary excitement, temperate, candid inquiry, by parties almost wholly

disinterested-these
were the aspects which were presented in a criminal
29
trial.

All proceedings took place under the observant and skilled eye
of the judge. Some Tories admitted that a prejudice existed in
such circumstances in favor of the accused, but this was grounds
for congratulation. The accused was encouraged to put his reliance
in the wise and humane consideration of the judge. It was open to
all to "observe that presiding spirit of humanity, as active as it was
benevolent, which from the bench itself, when the life of the accused was risked, so frequently tended to rebuke the severity of
the law." 30 Overly eager prosecutors were warned by the judge "to
126. Id. at 1512-14.
127. Id. at 945.
128. Id. at 946.
129.

11 PARL. DEB. (2d Ser.) 206 (1824).

130. Id. at 190.
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offer a plain, colorless statement of the case.' 131 The judge was entrusted with the task of ensuring that no hint of vengeance infected the proceedings.
Tory defenders of the existing judicial process argued that the
consequence of permitting defense counsel to address the jury
would be fatal to the mood of solemn, compassionate investigation." 2 The courtroom thus transformed would become the setting
for endless petty disputes as competing lawyers sought advantage
for their case. Trials would become occasions when lawyers tried to
flatter their vanity or enhance their reputations. Truth would be
lost in the confusion of other motives, and the defendant would
become a pretext. Prosecutors would necessarily become harsher in
their charges and more unrelenting in pressing their cases. The
judge would cease to be protective of the accused, perhaps finding
it necessary to act against the defendant after a highly emotional
appeal to the jury had been offered by defense counsel. The jury
itself would be suspicious of any defense presented by so suspect a
source as a skilled lawyer.
In sum, the Tory argument was that the change would work
utterly against the accused. 3 The reform would be a special hardship for the poor, since they could not afford the more skillful lawyers. The defenders of existing practice never tired of asserting
that their arrangements were the more solicitous of the well-being
of the poor. Charles Burrell attested that he had seen judges question witnesses on behalf of the accused, advise them how to plead,
and often counsel them to withdraw a guilty plea when he saw
them about to damage their own cases. 3 4 To expand the role of
defense counsel would destroy that special relationship. He, for
one, "was of [the] opinion that this Bill would operate unfairly between rich and poor."' 3 5 Inequality would be more exposed for being stripped of the protective benevolence of the judge.
The image offered by the courtroom was a primary concern of
the defenders of existing practices. The present situation presented
a picture of soothing mildness: "In a Criminal Court the impres131. Id.
132. Id. at 191-93 ("The proposition . . . [would] change the sober floor of a court of
justice into an arena for two ingenious combatants").
133. Id.
134. 29 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 362 (1836).
135. Id; see also id. at 359.
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sion produced was, that every one concerned in it appeared to be
engaged in a desire to produce an acquittal." 13 Guilt had to be so
overwhelming "as to take away almost all possibility of innocence
before a conviction could be obtained."' 137 The reform proposed
would remove the prisoner from his privileged position above the
fray.'38 Several magistrates supported the truth of this picture with
their own testimony. One justice reported that "he had never seen
an instance in which the person presiding in a Court of Justice...
did not consider himself Counsel for the prisoner, and who did not
consider it incumbent to enter into every point that tended to exculpate the prisoner." 39 Several other magistrates seconded this
140
assertion.
What especially frightened the foes of change were the consequences for the judge's role of permitting defense counsel such an
expanded sphere. It was bound to happen that "judges would lose
the high reputation" they presently enjoyed.14 ' "[T]he authority of
the judge would be despised," said one critic of reform.1 42 He
added that "the jury would be exposed to the corruptions of the
worst arts of the forum; they would be studiously placed in opposition to the judges; they would be flattered, or threatened, or
deceived into the usurpation of an irresponsible power, subversive
1 43
of the laws, and formidable equally to innocence and to guilt."'
Such language called up images of revolution; for the Tories, the
judge's authority protected society from the anarchy or tyranny of
the public both within and without the courtroom.
B.

The Lawyer as Advocate

The advocates of full privileges for defense counsel employed
the same kinds of arguments as had been directed against judicial
discretion in other contexts. For instance, George Lamb pointed to
136.
137.

16 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 1199-1200 (1833).
Id. at 1200.

138. Id. (According to Poulter, "giving to a prisoner full defence by Counsel. . .would
drive him from the high vantage ground he now occupied, and bring him down into an arena
of contention upon facts").
139.
140.

29 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 357 (1835).
Id.

141. 36 SECOND REPORT FROM THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL LAW 105 (1836).
[hereinafter SECOND REPORT 1836]; see also 35 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 171-72 (1836).
142.

SECOND REPORT

143.

Id.

1836, supra note 141, at 105.
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the wide diversity of attitudes expressed by judges towards the accused as proof of the precarious nature of the defendant's rights.
There were too many cases where a judge let a particularly strong
feeling against the accused influence his behavior."" Mackintosh
was adamant that "the safety of the prisoner... not [be] left to
the casual feelings of a judge."14' 5 Some radicals sought to link the
reform to a history of efforts to limit government power and executive abuse. They saw the denial of full protection by counsel as
part of the "same system" which "inflicted torture on the prisoner,
46
in order to extract from his own mouth evidence against him.'
Yet, once again the most consistent argument for reform was
that current practice created an image of "hardship" for the accused. As Lamb described it, "[e]very unlearned person who attended our criminal courts was struck by the unfairness of our present practice.' ' 1 7 He called upon his listeners to imagine the
situation of the accused, uneducated, afraid, and faced with the
charge of a skilled prosecutor while on trial for his life. After listening to the brilliant summation of the circumstantial evidence
against him, the prisoner turned to his counsel for help in refuting
the insinuations against him, only to be told by the judge that his
lawyer could do nothing to help him. "[T]he multitude in the court
were satisfied that any thing but justice had been done.' 48 Since
trial by battle had been abolished because of its gross inequality,
Lamb wondered how "a more absurd custom still" could continue,
"that which subjected every person prosecuted for felony to undergo the conflict of superior intellect, of eloquent competition,
without the means of fairly encountering it by the aid of counsel to
49
speak in their defence.'
144. 11 PARL. DEB. (2d Ser.) 185 (1824). Lamb, after illustrating the case of a judge who
did act as prisoner's counsel, goes on to describe another judge who failed to serve the prisoner in this way. The prisoner in the latter case himself told the judge that "if he had been,
as the law contemplated, his counsel, he would not have put such a question" to the prisoner. Id.
145. Id. See also Twiss's concurring remarks in 15 PARL. DEB. (2d Ser.) 610-13 (1826).
146. 24 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 160-61 (1834).
147. 11 PARL. DEB. (2d Ser.) 182 (1824).
148. 15 PARL. DEB. (2d Ser.) 595 (1826); see also 11 PARL. DEB. (2d Ser.) 210-13 (1824)
(Lushington's account of a jury being "led step by step to a persuasion of the guilt of the
party accused"). Sydney Smith recalls the plight of an innocent prisoner, who, opposed by a
"wealthy prosecutor," faced almost certain conviction for a crime he did not commit; SELECTED WRITINGS OF SYDNEY SMITH 239-40 (W.H. Auden ed. 1956).
149. 15 PARL. DEB. (2d Ser.) 596 (1826).
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The lesson of the trial seemed to be the oppressive nature of
English justice. In the same manner as the severe laws, this situation helped to defeat the ends of justice by creating a dangerous
sympathy between the spectator and the accused. "[A]s the prisoner was placed on trial under great and evident disadvantage,
there was often an undue leaning in his favour." 150 The point of
giving defense counsel the right to address the jury was not primarily to protect the accused. It was to defeat the unnatural sympathy that acted too frequently to set the guilty free.
As was the case with capital punishment, which was not entirely abolished, so a law in 1836 gave defense counsel the right to
address the jury, while leaving prosecutors with the last word."'
The cost of a lawyer still remained beyond the means of many of
the poor. Reform, however, need not be complete in order to accomplish its main purpose. A Tory had warned that the debate
over counsel "was not to be treated as a common parliamentary
discussion-it was a philosophical discussion of a very important
nature. 1 52 This was a perfectly accurate description of the de-

bates. What had once been called "a pure administration of justice, 15 3 was labeled by a Whig attorney general in 1835 "a scandal. 1 54 John Campbell went on to cite the necessity of vindicating

"the law of England from a deep and disgraceful stain."1 55 After
the bill was passed in 1836, Brougham could not help exulting because "in the course of this debate they had at last got rid of the
fiction so contrary to the fact, 'that the judge was counsel for the
prisoner.' " Such a notion had not been a fiction to judges in the
eighteenth century. The fact that even Lords Lyndhurst and
Wynford announced their conversions during the course of debate
helps measure the extent of the capitulation before a new understanding of the judicial process." 7

150. Id. at 627.
151. 35 PAHL. DE. (3d Ser.) 1248-49 (1836).
152. 29 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 360 (1835).
153. Id. at 498.
154. Id. at 500.
155. Id.
156. 35 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 186 (1836); see also 2 C. NEw, THE LIFE OF HENRY
BROUGHAM TO 1830, at 306-07 (1961).
157. 34 PARL. DE. (3d Ser.) 765, 771 (1836).
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CONCLUSION

The debate over the criminal law represented a minor but still
significant episode in the political life of early nineteenth-century
England. That it has not generally been deemed central may arise
from the fact that the battle was fought by a rear guard against
ideas that had already invaded the citadel. The Tories who fought
to preserve the royal prerogative of mercy and judicial discretion
were those most concerned in the exercise of that discretion; the
judges and law officers of the Crown. Yet, as Eldon's declining influence in the 1820s revealed, the ultra-Tories were a people increasingly left behind by their own party.158 Such Tories as Eldon
and Ellenborough occupied a strategic place in the House of Lords
where they could obstruct reform, but they could not forestall it
indefinitely, any more than they could block Catholic Emancipation or the Reform Bill. The speed with which change came and
the total rejection of the argument of mercy, suggest that some
major shift in opinion had already occurred. Discretion was not
merely rejected; the claims made about its nature were no longer
understood.
Advocates of reform enjoyed striking success in setting the
terms of the debate. What had once been accepted as the course of
the law-severity combined with mercy-was now reinterpreted as
a symptom of the breakdown of the judicial system. Whig reformers self-consciously appealed to the sentiments of a middle class
public against the spirit of the laws. 159 They no longer believed in
looking for mercy from a judge; they wanted to find humanity in
the laws. The complaint was that the judges no longer reflected
and responded to the sentiments of the people, and so justice was
disordered.
By focusing on the severity of the law and not on the practice
of mercy, as the Tories wanted to do, Romilly and Mackintosh dis158. See A.S.

TUBERVILLE, THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN THE AGE OP REFORM

177-80, 186-88,

213-15 (1958).

159. When one Tory suggested that a reform measure should be dropped because the
judges opposed it, a Whig responded that it was not the lawyer but the "satisfaction to the
people of England" that was the "chief ground of the motion." 15 PAR.. DEB. (2d Ser.) 604
(1826). When told that he was advocating reform before there was a public demand,
Thomas Denman replied that it was necessary to anticipate the public's reaction and so
"avoid the popular discontent." Id. at 632. See also SELECTED WRTINoS OF SYDNmY SMITH,
supra note 148, at 238 (wholesale hangings would have continued "if juries had not become
weary of the continual butchery, and resolved to acquit").
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credited not just the severity of the laws, but the system of justice
which operated on the basis of those laws. This explains why a
major portion of the debate centered on the question of who spoke
speculatively and who spoke from practical experience. What the
advocates of reform ultimately succeeded in doing was to refute
the charge that they were mere theoreticians. The practical knowledge and authority of the judges was replaced by that of
merchants, industrialists, and middle class radicals. The humanity
which the judges claimed in their practice was credited by the
Whigs not to any mercy inherent in the operation of justice, but to
the coincidence of bad laws, public opinion, and the demands of
the judge's own natural humanity. The final indignity for the
judges was that their own discretion was counted against them.
The central feature of early nineteenth-century reforms of law
and practice was the attempt to create an image of impersonal justice. Personal benevolence was no longer the guarantor of justice
for the accused. A new meaning had been given to the judge's obligation to secure "the attainment of impartial justice." 1 0 Lawyers
were the prominent figures in the reconstructed drama of the
courtroom; out of their noisy contest would emerge fairness as well
as truth. The clash of the advocates would also obscure social inequality and give "a greater character of fairness to the trial." ''
Severity was to be replaced by a certain and graduated series of
punishments, so that people would look to the character of the offense rather than the life of the accused. Under a system of punishments in harmony with popular feelings, there was "no sympathy for a delinquent if his life is spared, which is a great thing to
accomplish."" 2 The impulse behind this series of reforms was succinctly summarized by Mackintosh: "[L]aws should not only be
just, they should appear to be just; they should not only not be
unequal, they should be above the suspicion of inequality.' 63
By the early nineteenth century there were sufficient grounds
for believing that the operation of justice was not "above the suspicion of inequality." The law's severity attracted opprobrium, and
the judge's discretion focused such hostility upon the government.
Moreover, the Whigs were aware that the rise of large industrial
160. SECOND REPORT 1836, supra note 141, at 17-18.
161. Id. at 79. See also SELECTED WRITINGS OF SYDNEY
162. SECOND REPORT 1836, supra note 141, at 81.
163. 9 PARL. DEB. (2d Ser.) 408 (1823).

SMITH,

supra note 148, at 254.
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towns had made impossible the kind of personal relations upon
which eighteenth-century justice had been founded. Criminal justice was precarious because it had alienated both the middle and
the lower classes. The Whigs were no more democratic than the
Tories, but they sought reforms that would give justice a more
pleasing appearance. Romilly and Mackintosh did not share the
alarm felt by the Tories because they enjoyed the conviction that
they possessed the formula for reinvigorating the law. For them
reform was prudent; it was not revolutionary.
Both sides in the debate over the criminal law tried to define
the form of justice. They often spoke of sympathy for the accused
and of the protection of English liberties. Both expressed concern
about how the public viewed the process of justice. Both sought
legitimacy for and security through the laws. Where the Whigs and
Tories differed was over how these goals were to be attained. During the years of debate over reform by Parliament, the principles
of aristocratic justice were also under attack. The radical Ewart
linked the two campaigns; the old criminal laws "were the weeds of
the Statute book, and showed the corrupt soil from which they
sprung, a legislature which represented not the wants and wishes
of the people." 16 4 He went on to add that "[iut was wise, in a free
Constitution, to show confidence in the people for whom it existed."16 By 1832, political wisdom suggested that aristocratic justice provoked unnecessary animosity for the law. By the transformation of the criminal justice system, the Whig politicians sought
to sustain the belief that England did not depend on individual
discretion but upon the impartiality of a law that arose from the
wishes of the people.

164.
165.

11 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 950 (1832).
Id.

